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Abstract
A recent line of work has shown a qualitative equivalence between differentially private
PAC learning and online learning: A concept class is privately learnable if and only if it is
online learnable with a finite mistake bound. However, both directions of this equivalence incur
significant losses in both sample and computational efficiency. Studying a special case of this
connection, Gonen, Hazan, and Moran (NeurIPS 2019) showed that uniform or highly sample-
efficient pure-private learners can be time-efficiently compiled into online learners. We show that,
assuming the existence of one-way functions, such an efficient conversion is impossible even for
general pure-private learners with polynomial sample complexity. This resolves a question of
Neel, Roth, and Wu (FOCS 2019).
1 Introduction
Sensitive information in the form of medical records, social network data, and geospatial data can
have transformative benefits to society through modern data analysis. However, researchers bear a
critical responsibility to ensure that these analyses do not compromise the privacy of the individuals
whose data is used.
Differential privacy [DMNS06] offers formal guarantees and a rich algorithmic toolkit for study-
ing how such analyses can be conducted. To address settings where sensitive data arise in machine
learning, Kasiviswanathan et al. [KLN+11] introduced differentially private PAC learning as a
privacy-preserving version of Valiant’s PAC model for binary classification [Val84]. In the ensuing
decade a number of works (e.g., [BBKN14, BNSV15, FX15, BNS16, BNS19, ALMM19, KLM+19])
have developed sophisticated algorithms for learning fundamental concept classes while exposing
deep connections to optimization, online learning, and communication complexity along the way.
Despite all of this attention and progress, we are still far from resolving many basic questions
about the private PAC model. As an illustration of the state of affairs, the earliest results in
non-private PAC learning showed that the sample complexity of (i.e., the minimum number of
samples sufficient for) learning a concept class C is tightly characterized by its VC dimension [VC74,
BEHW89]. It is wide open to obtain an analogous characterization for private PAC learning. In
fact, it was only in the last year that a line of work [BNSV15, ALMM19, BLM20] culminated in
a characterization of when C is learnable using any finite number of samples whatsoever. The
following theorem captures this recent characterization of private learnability.
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Theorem 1 (Informal [ALMM19, BLM20]). Let C be a concept class with Littlestone dimension d =
L(C). Then 2O(d) samples are sufficient to privately learn C and Ω(log∗ d) samples are necessary.
The Littlestone dimension is a combinatorial parameter that exactly captures the complexity
of learning C in Littlestone’s mistake bound model of online learning [Lit87]. Thus, Theorem 1
characterizes the privately learnable concept classes as exactly those that are online learnable.
This is but one manifestation of the close connection between online learning and private algorithm
design, e.g., [RR10, DRV10, HR10, JKT12, FX15, AS17, ALMT17, ALMM19, BLM19, NRW19,
GHM19, BCS20, JKT20] that facilitates the transfer of techniques between the two areas.
Theorem 1 means that, at least in principle, online learning algorithms can be generically con-
verted into differentially private learning algorithms and vice versa. The obstacle, however, is
the efficiency of conversion, both in terms of sample use and running time. The forward direc-
tion (online learning =⇒ private learning) [BLM20] gives an algorithm that incurs at least an
exponential blowup in both complexities. The reverse direction (private learning =⇒ online learn-
ing) [ALMM19] is non-constructive: It is proved using the fact that every class with Littlestone
dimension at least d contains an embedded copy of T HRlog d, the class of one-dimensional thresh-
old functions over a domain of size log d. The characterization then follows from a lower bound of
Ω(log∗ d) on the sample complexity of privately learning T HRlog d.
There is limited room to improve the general sample complexity relationships in Theorem 1.
There are classes of Littlestone dimension d (e.g., Boolean conjunctions) that require Ω(d) samples
to learn even non-privately. Meanwhile, T HR2d has Littlestone dimension d but can be privately
learned using O˜((log∗ d)1.5) samples [KLM+19]. This latter result rules out, say, a generic conversion
from polynomial-sample private learners to online learners with polynomial mistake bound.
In this work, we address the parallel issue of computational complexity. Could there be a
computationally efficient black-box conversion from any private learner to an online learner? We
show that, under cryptographic assumptions, the answer is no.
Theorem 2 (Informal, building on [Blu94]). Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there
is a concept class that is privately PAC learnable in polynomial-time, but is not online learnable by
any poly-time algorithm with a polynomial mistake bound.
The question we study was explicitly raised by Neel, Roth, and Wu [NRW19]. They proved
a barrier result to the existence of “oracle-efficient” private learning by showing that a restricted
class of such learners can be efficiently converted into oracle-efficient online learners, the latter for
which negative results are known [HK16]. This led them to ask whether their barrier result could be
extended to all private learning algorithms. Our Theorem 2 thus stands as a “barrier to a barrier”
to general oracle-efficient private learning.
This question was also studied in a recent work of Gonen, Hazan, and Moran [GHM19]. They
gave an efficient conversion from pure-private learners to online learners with sublinear regret. As
we discuss in Section 3.6 the efficiency of their construction relies on either a uniform model of
learning (that turns out to be incompatible with pure differential privacy) or on an additional
assumption that the private learner is highly sample efficient. Theorem 2 rules out the existence of
such a conversion even for non-uniform pure-private learners without this extra sample efficiency
condition.
Proof idea of Theorem 2. In 1990, Blum [Blu94] defined a concept class we call OWS that is
(non-privately) efficiently PAC learnable but not poly-time online learnable. We prove Theorem 2
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by showing that OWS is efficiently privately PAC learnable as well. Blum’s construction builds on
the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali [GGM86] pseudorandom function generator to define families of
“one-way” sequences σ1, . . . , σr ∈ {0, 1}d for some r that is exponential in d. Associated to each σi
is a label bi ∈ {0, 1}. These strings and their labels have the property that they can be efficiently
computed in the forward direction, but are hard to compute in the reverse direction. Specifically,
given σi and any j > i, it is easy to compute σj and bj . On the other hand, given σj, it is hard to
compute σi and hard to predict bi.
To see how such sequences can be used to separate online and non-private PAC learning, consider
the problem of determining the label bi for a given string σi. In the online setting, an adversary may
present the sequence σr, σr−1, . . . in reverse. Then the labels bj are unpredictable to a poly-time
learner. On the other hand, a poly-time PAC learner can identify the σi∗ with smallest index in its
sample of size n. Then all but a roughly 1/n fraction of the underlying distribution on examples
will have index at least i∗ and can be predicted using the ease of forward computation.
Note that the PAC learner for OWS is not private, since the classifier based on i∗ essentially
reveals this sample in the clear. We design a private version of this learner by putting together
standard algorithms from the differential privacy literature in a modular way. We first privately
identify an i∗ that is approximately smallest in the sample. Releasing σi∗ directly at this stage is
still non-private. So instead, we privately check that every σi with i ≤ i∗ corroborates the string
σi∗ , in that σi∗ is the string that would be obtained by computing forward using any of these
strings. If the identity of σi∗ is stable in this sense and passes the privacy-preserving check, then it
is safe to release.
2 Preliminaries
An example is an element x ∈ {0, 1}d. A concept is a boolean function c : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}. A
labeled example is a pair (x, c(x)). A concept class C = {Cd}d∈N is a sequence where each Cd is a set
of concepts over {0, 1}d. Associated to each Cd is a (often implicit) representation scheme under
which concepts are encoded as bit strings. Define |c| to be the minimum length representation of c.
2.1 PAC Learning
In the PAC model, there is an unknown target concept c ∈ C and an unknown distribution D over
labeled examples (x, c(x)). Given a sample ((xi, c(xi)))
n
i=1 consisting of i.i.d. draws from D, the
goal of a learning algorithm is to produce a hypothesis h : {0, 1}d → {0, 1} that approximates c
with respect to D. Specifically, the goal is to find h with low population loss defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Population Loss). Let D be a distribution over {0, 1}d×{0, 1}. The population loss
of a hypothesis h : {0, 1}d → {0, 1} is
lossD(h) = Pr
(x,b)∼D
[h(x) 6= b].
Throughout this work, we consider improper learning algorithms where the hypothesis h need
not be a member of the class C. A learning algorithm L efficiently PAC learns C if for every target
concept c, every distribution D, and parameters α, β > 0, with probability at least 1−β the learner
L identifies a poly-time evaluable hypothesis h with lossD(h) ≤ α in time poly(d, 1/α, 1/β, |c|). It is
implicit in this definition that the number of samples n required by the learner is also polynomial.
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We will also only consider classes where |c| is polynomial in d for every c ∈ Cd, so we may regard a
class as efficiently PAC learnable if it is learnable using poly(d, 1/α, 1/β) time and samples.
2.2 Online Learning
We consider two closely related models of online learning: The mistake-bound model and the no-
regret model. Our negative result holds for the weaker no-regret model, making our separation
stronger. We first review Littlestone’s mistake-bound model of online learning [Lit87]. This model
is defined via a two-player game between a learner and an adversary. Let C be a concept class and
let c ∈ C be chosen by the adversary. Learning proceeds in rounds. In each round t = 1, . . . , 2d,
(i) The adversary selects an xt ∈ {0, 1}d,
(ii) The learner predicts bˆt ∈ {0, 1}, and
(iii) The learner receives the correct labeling bt = c(xt).
A (deterministic) learning algorithm learns c with mistake boundM if for every adversarial ordering
of the examples, the total number of incorrect predictions the learner makes is at most M . We
say that the learner efficiently mistake-bound learns C if for every c ∈ C it has mistake bound
poly(d, |c|) and runs in time poly(d, |c|) in every round.
We also consider a relaxed model of online learning in which the learner aims to achieve no-
regret, i.e., err with respect to c in a vanishing fraction of rounds. Let T be a time horizon known
to a randomized learner. The goal of the learner is to minimize its regret, defined by
RT =
T∑
t=1
I[bˆt 6= c(xt)].
We say that a learner efficiently no-regret learns C if there exists η > 0 such that for every adver-
sary, it achieves E[RT ] = poly(d, |c|) · T 1−η using time poly(d, |c|, T ) in every round. Under this
formulation, every efficient mistake-bound learner is also an efficient no-regret learner.
We point out two non-standard features of this definition of efficiency. First, “no-regret” typi-
cally requires regret to be sublinear in T , i.e., o(T ) whereas we require it to be strongly sublinear
T 1−η. A stronger condition like this is needed to make the definition nontrivial because a regret
upper bound of T ≤ d ·T/ log T = poly(d) ·o(T ) is always achievable in our model by random guess-
ing. Many no-regret algorithms achieve strongly sublinear regret, e.g., the experts/multiplicative
weights algorithm and the algorithm of [GHM19] that both achieve η = 1/2. Second, it would be
more natural to require the learner to run in time polynomial in log T , the description length of
the time horizon, rather than T itself. The relaxed formulation here only makes our lower bounds
stronger, and we use it to be consistent with the positive result of [GHM19] that runs in time
proportional to T .
2.3 Differential Privacy
Definition 4 (Differential Privacy). Let ε, δ > 0. A randomized algorithm L : Xn → R is (ε, δ)-
differentially private if for every pair of datasets S, S′ differing in at most one entry, and every
measurable set T ⊆ R,
Pr[L(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eε Pr[L(S′) ∈ T ] + δ.
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We refer to the special case where δ = 0 as pure ε-differential privacy, and the case where δ > 0
as approximate differential privacy.
When L is a learning algorithm, we require that this condition hold for all neighboring pairs
of samples S, S′ – not just those generated according to a distribution on examples labeled by a
concept in a given class.
3 Learnability of One-Way Sequences
3.1 One-Way Sequences
For every d, Blum defines a concept class OWSd consisting of functions over the domain {0, 1}d
that can be represented using poly(d) bits and evaluated in poly(d) time. The concepts in OWSd
are indexed by bit strings s ∈ {0, 1}k , where k = ⌊√d⌋ − 1. The definition of OWSd is based on
two efficiently representable and computable functions G : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}d−k and f :
{0, 1}k×{0, 1}k → {0, 1} that are based on the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali pseudorandom function
family [GGM86]. The exact definition of these functions are not important to our treatment, so
we refer the reader to [Blu94] for details. Here, G(i, s) computes the string σi as described in the
introduction, and f(i, s) computes its label bi. For convenience we identify {0, 1}k with [2k].
We are now ready to define the concept class OWSd = {cs}s∈{0,1}k where
cs(i, σ) =
{
1 if σ = G(i, s) and f(i, s) = 1
0 otherwise.
We recall the two key properties of the sequences σi obtained from these strings. They are easy
to compute in the forward direction, even in a random-access fashion, but difficult to compute in
reverse. These properties are captured by the following claims.
Proposition 5 ([Blu94]). There is an efficiently computable function ComputeForward : {0, 1}k ×
{0, 1}k × {0, 1}d−k → {0, 1}d−k × {0, 1} such that ComputeForward(j, i,G(i, s)) = 〈G(j, s), f(j, s)〉
for every j > i.
Proposition 6 ([Blu94], Corollary 3.4). Suppose G and f are constructed using a secure pseudo-
random generator. Let O be an oracle that, on input j > i and G(i, s) outputs 〈G(j, s), f(j, s)〉.
For every poly-time probabilistic algorithm A and every i ∈ {0, 1}k,
Pr[AO(i,G(i, s)) = f(i, s)] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(d),
where the probability is taken over the coins of A and uniformly random s ∈ {0, 1}k.
Blum used Proposition 6 to show that OWS cannot be efficiently learned in the mistake bound
model (even with membership queries). Here, we adapt his argument to the setting of no-regret
learning.
Proposition 7. If G and f are constructed using a secure pseudorandom generator, then OWS
cannot be learned by an efficient no-regret algorithm.
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Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there were a poly-time online learner L for OWS
achieving regret dc · T 1−η for constants c, η > 0 and sufficiently large d. Consider an adversary
that presents examples (2k, G(2k , s); f(2k, s)), (2k−1, G(2k − 1, s); f(2k − 1, s)), . . . to the learner in
reverse order. Then the expected number of mistakes L makes on the first T = (4dc)1/η = poly(d)
examples is at most dc · T 1−η ≤ T/4. By averaging, there exists an index 2k − T/4 ≤ t ≤ 2k such
that the probability that L makes a mistake on example (t,G(t, s)) is at most 1/4.
We now use L to construct an adversary that contradicts Proposition 6. Consider the oracle algo-
rithmAO that on input (t,G(t, s)) invokes the oracle to compute the sequence (2k, G(2k, s); f(2k, s)),
(2k−1, G(2k−1, s); f(2k−1, s)), . . . , (t+1, G(t+1, s); f(t+1, s)) and presents these labeled examples
to L. Let b the prediction that L makes when subsequently given the example (t,G(t, s)). This
agrees with f(t, s) with probability at least 3/4, contradicting Proposition 6.
In the rest of this section, we construct an (ε, δ)-differentially private learner for OWS .
3.2 Basic Differential Privacy Tools
The sensitivity of a function q : Xn → R is the maximum value of |q(S) − q(S′)| taken over all
pairs of datasets S, S′ differing in one entry.
Lemma 8 (Laplace Mechanism). The Laplace distribution with scale λ, denoted Lap(λ), is sup-
ported on R and has probability density function fLap(λ)(x) = exp(−|x|/λ)/2λ. If q : Xn → R
has sensitivity 1, then the algorithm MLap(S) = q(S) + Lap(1/ε) is ε-differentially private and, for
every β > 0, satisfies |MLap(S)− q(S)| ≤ log(2/β)/ε with probability at least 1− β.
Remark 9. We describe our algorithm using the Laplace mechanism as a matter of mathematical
convenience, even though sampling from the continuous Laplace distribution is incompatible with
the standard Turing machine model of computation. To achieve strict polynomial runtimes on finite
computers we would use in its place the Bounded Geometric Mechanism [GRS12, BV18].
Theorem 10 (Exponential Mechnanism [MT07]). Let q : Xn × R → R be a sensitivity-1 score
function. The the algorithm that samples r ∈ R with probability ∝ exp(εq(S, r)/2) satisfies
1. ε-differential privacy, and
2. For every S, with probability at least 1− β the sampled rˆ satisfies
q(S, rˆ) ≥ max
r∈R
q(S, r)− 2 log(|R|/β)
ε
.
The following “basic” composition theorem allows us to bound the privacy guarantee of a
sequence of adaptively chosen algorithms run over the same dataset.
Lemma 11 (Composition, e.g., [DL09]). Let M1 : X
n → R1 be (ε, δ)-differentially private. Let
M2 : X
n × R1 → R2 be (ε2, δ2) differentially private for every fixed value of its second argument.
Then the composition M(S) =M2(S,M1(S)) is (ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2)-differentially private.
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3.3 Private Robust Minimum
Definition 12. Given a dataset S = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [R]n, an α-robust minimum for S is a number
r ∈ [R] such that
1. |{i : xi ≤ r}| ≥ αn, and
2. |{i : xi ≤ r}| ≤ 2αn.
Note that r need not be an element of S itself – this is important for ensuring that we can
release a robust minimum privately. Condition 2 guarantees that r is approximately the minimum
of S. Condition 1 guarantees that this condition holds robustly, i.e., one needs to change at least
αn points of S before r fails to be at least the minimum.
Theorem 13. There exist polynomial-time algorithms Minpure and Minapprox that each solve the
private robust minimum problem with probability at least 1− β, where
1. Algorithm Minpure is ε-differentially private and succeeds as long as
n ≥ O
(
log(R/β)
αε
)
.
2. Algorithm Minapprox is (ε, δ)-differentially private and succeeds as long as
n ≥ O˜
(
(log∗R)1.5 · log1.5(1/δ) · log(1/β)
αε
)
.
Proof. The algorithms are obtained by a reduction to the interior point problem. Both this problem
and essentially the same reduction are described in [BNSV15] but we give the details for complete-
ness. In the interior point problem, we are given a dataset S ∈ [R]n and the goal is to identify
r ∈ [R] such that minS ≤ r ≤ maxS. An (ε, δ)-DP algorithm that solves the interior point problem
using m samples and success probability 1− β can be used to solve the robust minimum problem
using n = O(m/α) samples: Given an instance S of the robust minimum problem, let S′ consist of
the elements ⌈αn⌉ through ⌊2αn⌋ of S in sorted order and apply the interior point algorithm to S′.
The exponential mechanism provides a pure ε-DP algorithm for the interior point problem with
sample complexity O(log(R/β)/ε) [Smi11]. Let x(1), . . . , x(n) denote the elements of S in sorted
order. The appropriate score function q(S, r) is the maximum value of min{t, n − t} such that
x(1) ≤ · · · ≤ x(t) ≤ r ≤ x(t+1) ≤ · · · ≤ x(n). Thus q(S, r) ranges from a maximum of ⌊n/2⌋ iff r is
a median of S to a minimum of 0 iff r is not an interior point of S. By Theorem 10, the released
point has positive score (and hence is an interior point) as long as n > 4 log(R/β)/ε. Moreover, one
can efficiently sample from the exponential mechanism distribution in this case as the distribution
is constant on every interval of the form [x(t), x(t+1)).
For (ε, δ)-DP with δ > 0, Kaplan et al. [KLM+19] provide an efficient algorithm for the interior
point problem (with constant failure probability) using O˜((log∗R)1.5 log1.5(1/δ)/ε) samples. Taking
the median of O(log(1/β)) repetitions of their algorithm on disjoint random subsamples gives the
stated bound.
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3.4 Private Most Frequent Item
Let S ∈ Xn be a dataset and let x ∈ X be the item appearing most frequently in S. The goal of the
“private most-frequent-item problem” is to identify x with high probability under the assumption
that the most frequent item is stable: its identify does not change in a neighborhood of the given
dataset S. For x ∈ X and S = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn, define freqS(x) = |{i : xi = x}|.
Definition 14. An algorithm M : Xn → [R] solves the most-frequent-item problem with gap
GAP and failure probability β if the following holds. Let S ∈ Xn be any dataset with x∗ =
argmaxx freqS(x) and
freqS(x
∗) ≥ max
x 6=x∗
freqS(x) + GAP .
Then with probability at least 1− β, we have M(S) = x.
Theorem 15 ([BV18]). There exist polynomial-time algorithms Freqpure and Freqapprox that each
solve the private most-frequent-item problem with probability at least 1− β, where
1. Algorithm Freqpure is ε-differentially private and succeeds as long as GAP ≥ O(log(R/β)/αε).
2. Algorithm Freqapprox is (ε, δ)-differentially private and succeeds as long as GAP ≥ O(log(n/δβ)/αε).
Balcer and Vadhan [BV18] actually solved the more general problem of computationally efficient
private histogram estimation. Theorem 15 follows from their algorithm by reporting the privatized
bin with the largest noisy count.
3.5 Privately Learning OWSd
Algorithm 1 Pure Private Learner for OWSd
1. Let S+ = ((i1, σ1), . . . , (im, σm)) be the subsequence of positive examples in S, where i1 ≤
i2 ≤ . . . ≤ im.
2. Let mˆ = m+ Lap(3/ε). If mˆ ≤ αn/3, output the all-0 hypothesis.
3. Let I = (i1, . . . , im). Run Minpure(I) using privacy parameter ε/3 to identify a (αn/6mˆ)-
robust minimum i∗ of I with failure probability β/6.
4. For every ij ∈ I with ij < i∗ let 〈σˆj , bˆj〉 = ComputeForward(i∗, ij , σj). For every ij ∈ I with
ij = i
∗ let 〈σˆj , bˆj〉 = 〈σij , bj〉.
5. Run Freqpure(〈σˆ1, bˆ1〉, . . . , 〈σˆℓ, bˆℓ〉) using privacy parameter ε/3 to output 〈σ∗, b∗〉 with failure
probability β/6. Here, ℓ is the largest j for which ij ≤ i∗.
6. Return the hypothesis h(i, σ) =
“If i < i∗, output 0. If i = i∗, output b∗ if σ∗ = σ and output 0 otherwise. If i > i∗, run
algorithm ComputeForward(i, i∗, σ∗) = 〈σˆ, bˆ〉. If σ = σˆ, output bˆ. Else, output 0.”
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Theorem 16. Algorithm 1 is an ε-differentially private and (α, β)-PAC learner for OWSd running
in time poly(d, 1/α, log(1/β)) using
n = O
(√
d+ log(1/β)
αε
)
samples.
Proof. Algorithm 1 is an adaptive composition of three (ε/3)-differentially private algorithms, hence
ε-differentially private by Lemma 11.
To show that it is a PAC learner, we first argue that the hypothesis produced achieves low error
with respect to the sample S, and then argue that it generalizes to the underlying distribution.
That is, we first show that for every realizable sample S, with probability at least 1− β/2 over the
randomness of the learner alone, the hypothesis h satisfies
lossS(h) =
1
n
n∑
k=1
I[h(xk) 6= bk] ≤ α/2.
We consider several cases based on the number of positive examples m = |S+|. First suppose
m ≤ αn/4. Then Lemma 8 guarantees that the algorithm outputs the all-0 hypothesis with
probability at least 1− β in Step 2, and this hypothesis has sample loss at most α/4.
Now suppose m = |S+| ≥ αn/2. Then with probability at least 1 − β/3 we have |mˆ −m| ≤
3 log(6/β)/ε. In particular this means mˆ ≥ αn/3, so the algorithm continues past Step 2. Now with
probability at least 1−β/3, Step 3 identifies a point i∗ such that |{i ∈ I : i ≤ i∗}| ≥ (αn/6mˆ) ·m ≥
αn/10 and |{i ∈ I : i ≤ i∗}| ≤ (αn/6mˆ) ·m ≤ αn/2. The first condition, in particular, guarantees
that ℓ ≥ αn/10. Realizability of the sample S guarantees that the points 〈σˆ1, bˆ1〉, . . . , 〈σˆℓ, bˆℓ〉 are all
identical. So with the parameter GAP = ℓ ≥ αn/10, Step 5 succeeds in outputting their common
value 〈σ∗, b∗〉 with probability at least 1− β/3.
We now argue that the hypothesis h produced in Step 6 succeeds on all but αn/2 examples. A
case analysis shows that the only input samples on which h makes an error are those (ij , σj) ∈ S+
for which ij < i
∗. The success criterion of Step 3 ensures that the number of such points is at most
αn/2.
The final case where αn/4 < m < αn/2 is handled similarly, except it is now also acceptable
for the algorithm to terminate early in Step 2, outputting the all-0 hypothesis.
We now argue that achieving low error with respect to the sample is sufficient to achieve low
error with respect to the distribution: If the learner above achieves sample loss lossS(h) ≤ α/2
with probability at least 1 − β/2, then it is also an (α, β)-PAC learner for OWSd when given at
least n ≥ 8 log(2/β)/α samples. The analysis follows the standard generalization argument for
one-dimensional threshold functions, and our presentation follows [BNSV15].
Fix a realizable distribution D (labeled by concept cs) and let H be the set of hypotheses that
the learner could output given a sample from D. That is, H consists of the all-0 hypothesis and
every hypothesis of the form hi∗ as constructed as in Step 6. We may express the all-0 hypothesis
as h2d+1. It suffices to show that for a sample S drawn i.i.d. from a realizable distribution D that
Pr[∃h ∈ H : lossD(h) ≤ α and lossS(h) ≤ α/2] ≤ β/2.
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Let i− be the largest number such that lossD(hi−) > α. If some hi has lossD(hi) > α then i ≤ i−,
and hence for any sample, lossS(hi−) ≤ lossS(hi). So it suffices to show that
Pr[lossS(hi−) ≤ α/2] ≤ β/2.
Define E = {(i,G(i, s)) : i < i− and f(i, s) = 1} to be the set of examples on which hi− makes
a mistake. By a Chernoff bound, the probability that after n independent samples from D, fewer
than αn/2 appear in E is at most exp(−αn/8) ≤ β/2 provided n ≥ 8 log(2/β)/α.
The same argument, replacing the use of Minpure with Minapprox and Freqpure with Freqapprox in
Algorithm 1 yields
Theorem 17. There is an (ε, δ)-differentially private and (α, β)-PAC learner for OWSd running
in time poly(d, 1/α, log(1/β)) using
n = O˜
(
(log∗ d)1.5 · log1.5(1/δ) · log(1/β)
αε
)
samples.
3.6 Comparison to [GHM19]
Gonen et al. [GHM19] proved a positive result giving conditions under which pure-private learners
can be efficiently compiled into online learners. The purpose of this section is to describe their
model and result and, in particular, explain why it does not contradict Theorem 16.
Their reduction works as follows. Let C be a concept class that is pure-privately learnable
(with fixed constant privacy and accuracy parameters) using m0 samples. Consider running this
algorithm roughly N = exp(m0) times on a fixed dummy input, producing hypotheses h1, . . . , hN .
Pure differential privacy guarantees that for every realizable distribution on labeled examples, with
high probability one of these hypotheses hi will have small loss. This idea can be used to construct
an online learner for C by treating the random hypotheses h1, . . . , hN as experts and running
multiplicative weights to achieve no-regret with respect to the best one online.
As it is described in [GHM19], this is a computationally efficient reduction from no-regret
learning to uniform pure-private PAC learning. In the uniform PAC model, there is a single
infinite concept class C consisting of functions c : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}. An efficient uniform PAC
learner for C uses m(α, β) samples to learn a hypothesis with loss at most α and failure probability
β in time poly(|c|, 1/α, 1/β). Note that the number of samples m(α, β) is completely independent
of the target concept c. This contrasts with the non-uniform model, where the number of samples
is allowed to grow with d, the domain size of c.
Another noteworthy difference comes when we introduce differential privacy. In the uniform
model, one can move to a neighboring dataset by changing a single entry to any element of {0, 1}∗.
In the non-uniform model, on the other hand, an entry may only change to another element of
the same {0, 1}d. This distinction affects results for pure-private learning, as we will see below.
However, it does not affect (ε, δ)-DP learning, as one can always first run the algorithm described
in Theorem 15 to privately check that all or most of the elements in the sample come from the
same {0, 1}d.
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A simple example to keep in mind when considering feasibility of learning in the uniform model
is the class of point functions POINT = {px : x ∈ {0, 1}∗} where px(y) = 1 iff x = y. This class is
efficiently uniformly PAC-learnable using m(α, β) = O(log(1/β)/α) samples by returning px where
x is any positive example in the dataset.
The class POINT turns out to be uniformly PAC-learnable with pure differential privacy as
well [BNS19]. However, this algorithm is not computationally efficient. The following claim shows
that this is inherent, as indeed it is even impossible to uniformly learn POINT using hypotheses
with short description lengths.
Proposition 18. Let L be a pure 1-differentially private algorithm for uniformly (1/2, 1/2)-PAC
learning POINT . Then for every labeled sample S, we have Eh←L(S)[|h|] =∞.
Proof. Let t > 0. We will show that E[|h|] ≥ t. Let n be the number of samples used by L. Let Ht
be the set of all functions h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} with description length |h| ≤ 2ent. Let x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗
be any pair of points such that h(x) = 0 or h(y) = 1 for every h ∈ Ht. Such a pair x, y exists by the
simple combinatorial Lemma 19 stated and proved below, together with the fact that Ht is finite.
Consider the target concept c = px and the distribution D that is uniform over (x, 1) and (y, 0).
Then accuracy of the learner L requires that PrS′∼Dn [L(S
′) /∈ Ht] ≥ 1/2. Since any sample S′ can
be obtained from S by changing at most n elements of S, pure differential privacy implies that
Pr[L(S) /∈ Ht] ≥ e−n/2. Hence Eh←L(S)[|h|] ≥ 2ent · e−n/2 ≥ t as we wanted to show.
Lemma 19. Let S = {S1, . . . , Sn} be a collection of subsets of [m] such that for every pair x, y ∈ [m]
there exists i ∈ [n] such that x ∈ Si and y /∈ Si. Then n ≥ logm+ 1.
Proof. We prove this by induction on m. If m = 2, then clearly we need n ≥ 2. Now suppose
inductively that S partitions the set [m] in the described fashion. Then either S1 or S1 has size
at least m/2. If |S1| ≥ m/2, then the n − 1 sets S2 ∩ S1, . . . , Sn ∩ S1 partition a set of size m/2
in the described way, so n − 1 ≥ log(m/2) + 1, i.e., n ≥ logm + 1. A similar argument holds if
|S1| ≥ m/2.
In Appendix A we generalize this argument to show that every infinite concept class is impossible
to learn uniformly with pure differential privacy:
Proposition 20. Let L be a pure 1-differentially private algorithm for uniformly (1/2, 1/2)-PAC
learning an infinite concept class C. Then for every labeled sample S, we have Eh←L(S)[|h|] =∞.
At first glance, this may seem to make the construction of [GHM19] vacuous. However, it is
still of interest as it can be made to work in non-uniform model of pure-private PAC learning under
the additional assumption that the pure-private learner is highly sample efficient. That is, if Cd
is learnable using m(d) = O(log d) samples, then the number of experts N remains polynomial.
There is indeed a computationally efficient non-uniform pure private learner for POINT with
sample complexity O(1) [BNS19] that can be transformed into an efficient online learner using
their algorithm. This does not contradict our negative result Theorem 16, as that pure-private
learner uses sample complexity O(
√
d).
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that under cryptographic assumptions, efficient private learnability does
not necessarily imply efficient online learnability. Our work raises a number of additional questions
about the relationship between efficient learnability between the two models.
Uniform approximate-private learning. In Section 3.6 we discussed the uniform model of
(private) PAC learning and argued that efficient learnability is impossible under pure privacy. It is,
however, possible under approximate differential privacy, e.g., for point functions. Thus it is of inter-
est to determine whether uniform approximate-private learners can be efficiently transformed into
online learners. Our negative result for non-uniform learning uses sample complexity O˜((log∗ d)1.5)
to approximate-privately learn the class OWSd, so it does not rule out this possibility.
Efficient conversion from online to private learning. Is a computationally efficient version
of [BLM20] possible? Note that to exhibit a concept class C refuting this, C must in particular be
efficiently PAC learnable but not efficiently privately PAC learnable. There is an example of such
a class C based on “order-revealing encryption” [BZ16]. However, a similar adversary argument as
what is used for OWS can be used to show that this class C is also not efficiently online learnable.
Agnostic private vs. online learning. Finally, we reiterate a question of [GHM19] who asked
whether efficient agnostic private PAC learners can be converted to efficient agnostic online learners.
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A General Impossibility of Pure-Private Uniform Learning
Proof of Proposition 20. The proof is identical to that of Proposition 18, except that we need to
show that given any finite set of hypotheses Ht, there exists a concept c ∈ C and a pair x, y such
that c(x) = 1 and c(y) = 0 but h(x) = 0 or h(y) = 1 for every h ∈ Ht. The existence of such a
concept follows from the variant of Lemma 19 stated below.
Let S = {S1, . . . , Sn} be a collection of subsets of {0, 1}∗. We say that S generates another set
T ⊆ {0, 1}∗ if for every pair x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗ with x ∈ T and y /∈ T , there exists i ∈ [n] such that
x ∈ Si and y /∈ Si.
Lemma 21. A collection S = {S1, . . . , Sn} generates at most 22n distinct sets T ⊆ {0, 1}∗.
Proof. By doubling the size of S we may assume it is closed under complement, i.e., S ∈ S iff
S ∈ S. Let us say that a set R ⊆ {0, 1}∗ is pairwise separated by S if for every pair x, y ∈ R, there
exists i ∈ [n] such that x ∈ Si and y /∈ Si. Let r denote the maximum size of a set that is pairwise
separated by S. Lemma 19 guarantees shows that r ≤ 2n−1. We will show that if T is generated
by S, then determining the membership of each element of R in T completely determines the set
T . Therefore, there are at most 2r ≤ 22n−1 possible choices for T .
To see this, suppose for the sake of contradiction that there are two sets T1, T2 that are generated
by S for which T1 ∩ R = T2 ∩ R := I. Let z be an element on which T1, T2 disagree; say z ∈ T1
but z /∈ T2. We derive our contradiction by showing that R ∪ {z} is pairwise separated by S,
contradicting the maximality of R. To do so, all we need to show is that for every y ∈ R, there
exists Si such that z ∈ Si and y /∈ Si, and that there exists Sj such that z /∈ Sj and y ∈ Sj. If
y ∈ I, we can take Si to be the set such that z /∈ Si and y ∈ Si as guaranteed by the fact that S
generates T2. If y /∈ I, we can take Si to be the set such that z ∈ Si and y /∈ Si as guaranteed by
the fact that S generates T1. A similar argument can be used to construct Sj.
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